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CASES NOTED
the admittance of the surviving witnesses' testimony. In adopting the more
modern and liberal minority rule which allows such testimony into evidence
the court said:
Here we have a guest in an automobile, who is completely inactive
as to the controls of the automobile in which he is riding, who
in no way mutually participates in the ensuing collision, and who
is merely the unfortunate victim of the actions of others which
actions he observes as independent facts and not as part of a
transaction between the decedent driver and himself.'7
The holding in the instant case removes this state from the limbo
of its prior intermediate position' 8 and expressly adopts the more liberal
minority view.
It is submitted that the result in the instant case is both proper and
desirable. The exclusion of a survivor's testimony has been uniformly
condemned by a great majority of the modem writers on the law of
evidence' as a rule "unfounded in reason . . . which leads to more
false decisions than it prevents and encumbers the profession with a profuse
mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words. ' 20 The
rule has been strongly condemned by the very courts which enforce it,
such courts holding themselves bound to do so until the legislature repeals
the statute.21 If a court can construe a statute so as to exclude evidence,
surely it is within the judicial power to construe the same statute to admit
such evidence.
RiCHAMRn E. RECKSON
ADMIRALTY - FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A Spanish seaman injured aboard a ship on which he was a crew
member, brought an action for personal injuries on the law side of a
United States District Court against four separate corporate defendants.
The claims against the vessel's Spanish owners and their agents, a New
17. Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559, 563 (Fla. App. 1959).
18. Kilmer v. Gustafson, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954); Herring v. Eiland, 81
So.2d 645 (Fla. 1954).
19. 2 \VIcNIoRU, EviDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940); Report of the Legal Research
Committee of the Commonwealth Fund cited in 2 ,WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE, Supra; MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 92 (1942); 5 CHEAMTIERNYE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 3670 (1916).
20. 2 WIGNIORE, EvIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
21. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1946): "We reach the result
without enthusiasm. The rule excluding a survivor's testimony seems to stand in the
almost unique situation of being condemned by all of the modeni writers on the law
of evidence. It is said to be as unsound and undesirable as the rule excluding the
testimony of parties of which the survivor rule is a part. But we believe this to be a
case where a rule so thoroughly established through many generations of judicial history
should be removed by legislative action or .court rule which applies generally and not by
judicial legislation against a party in a particular case."
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York corporation, were asserted under the Jones Act' and general maritime
law. The liability of the other two defendants, a New York and a Delaware
corporation engaged in work aboard the ship, was founded upon general
maritime law. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court dismissed
the claims under general maritime law against the Spanish corporation,
holding that such claims did not give rise to a federal question and in the
absence of diversity of citizenship a federal court sitting at law in maritime
matters had no jurisdiction. 2 Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
The source of jurisdiction in litigation based on federal maritime law
is article I11, section 2 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant was
implemented by the Judiciary Act of 17893 which gave to the federal
district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right
of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it., 4 The Act of 1789 did not grant the lower federal courts original
jurisdiction over civil actions arising "under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." ihe distinction that the cases falling within
the "arising under" clause were wholly different and thereby excluded
from "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" within the meaning of the
Constitution, was enunciated by Justice Marshall in American Insurance
Co. v. Canter.5 Between the Canter case and 1875, there is no evidence of a
rejection, either legislative or judicial, of justice Marshall's language that
"A case in admiralty does not in fact arise under the Constitution or laws
of the United States."6 During this period maritime controversies were
continually treated as being founded upon an independent source of
1. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.SC, § 688 (1958) provides: "Any seaman who
shall stiffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain
an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy
in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply .. "
2. The Court declared that even though the Jones Act was inapplicable to the
claim against the Spanish company as Spanish law provided the proper remedy,jurisdiction over the American corporations should be retained by the district court
"pendent" to its jurisdiction over the Spanish company under the Jones Act.
3. 1 Stat. 77 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
4. This latter phrase gave recognition to the fact that many causes of action
cognizable in admiralty had been litigated prior to this enactment in the stale courts
of common law. The right to these remedies, by an action in personam, was preserved
by this saving to suitor's clause. See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907): New Jersey
Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 flov.) 465 (1848); 2 STORY.
COIMENTARIES ON TIHE CONSTITUTION OF TIE UNITED STATF.S § 1672 (1858), In the
1948 revision of the Judicial Code, this latter phrase was changed to read, "... saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." The
Revisers Note, however, indicates that no substantive change was intended. See
Madroga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 560 t. 12 (1954).
5. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 510, 544 (1828): "'The constitution certainly contemplates
these as three distinct classes of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of jirisdiction
over one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The
discrimination made between them is, we think, conclusive against their identity,"
6. ld. at 543.
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jurisdiction requiring litigants in the federal courts to proceed, according
to the historic admiralty procedure, by a judge without a jury.7 If
proceedings at law with a jury were sought, a wholly distinct basis of
federal jurisdiction had to be established. An action at law could be brought
under the "saving to suitors" clause in a state court; if jurisdiction was
founded upon diversity of citizenship, it could then be brought in a
federal court.9
This view went unchanged notwithstanding the first grant'0 to the
-federal lower courts of jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States" by the Judiciary Act of 1875.11 Even with this broadened
scope of power, it was not until 1950, in Jausson v. Swedish American Line,'2
that it was proposed that a claim in admiralty should be considered as
"arising under" for purposes of federal jurisdiction. This proposal was a
corollary to the doctrine of the supremacy of federal maritime law over
state law which was enunciated by a line of cases' 3 beginning with
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.14
These cases established the concept that "the Constitution itself
adopted and established as part of the laws of the United States, approved
rules of the general maritime law.""' This has had the effect of establishing
federal maritime law as the controlling substantive law in admiralty cases
in any court, thus displacing conflicting state common and statutory law
in inattcrs which require a uniformity of decision.1 An extension of this
maritime supremacy doctrine led to a controversy among the circuit courts
as to the basis of federal jurisdiction in seamen's personal injury actions
7. The Sara, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 644 (1823); The Betsy and Charlotte, 8 U.S.
(4 Crancb) 673 (1808); The Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 320 (1804); The Vengeance,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 610 (1796).
8. Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356, (1876); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 74 (1871); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 266 (1868); line v. 'revor,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
9. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78 (1789), endowed the then Circuit
Courts with diversity jurisdiction.
10. With the exception of the short lived Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, 92
(1801), repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802).
11. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
12. 185 F.2d 212, 217-218 (1st Cir. 1950). Authough decided on other grounds,
there was strong dictum to the effect that admiralty law did give rise to a "federal
question."
13. Pope & Talbot Co., Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S, 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co. 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
14. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
15. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).
16. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918): "And as a final
bit of curiosa it may be noted that, while the Supreme Court was definitely establishing
the supremacy of federal maritime law over state common law, it was simultaneously,
under Erie R.R. Co. v, Tompkins, establishing the supremacy of state common law
over the general federal common law." GILMORE AND BI.AcK, ADMIRALTY 377 (1957).
See generally Stevens, Erid R.R. Co. v. TomPkins and the Uniform General Maritime
Law, 66 HaRv. L. Rvv. 246 (1950).
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brought on the law side of the federal district courts. This difficulty
is occasioned by the desire for a trial by jury, rather than the traditional
admiralty action tried by a judge.
Conflict has arisen where claims under general maritime law arc sought
undcr the jurisdictional grant of section 133117 of the Federal judicial
Code as cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the Unitcd States. An
action brought under the Jones Act has been held to conic under the
jurisdictional grant of section 1331.18 It was not considered, however, that
the nonstatutory traditional admiralty actions for unseaworthiness or fol
maintenance and cure should similarly give rise to a federal question. 10
In Doucette v. Vincent,20 the First Circuit held that the maritime
supremacy doctrine in the Jensen line of cases gave rise to a constitutional
principle which will support "federal question" jurisdiction. The Second
and 'Third Circuits denied such jurisdiction, 1 basing their conclusions22
on the historical background of nondivcrsity jurisdiction.
It is primarily this historical background coupled with what Justice
Frankfurter calls "commonscnsical and layeor-like modes of construction" 23
which forms the basis for decision in the instant case. The "unquestioned"
acceptance 2' until 1950 of the distinction between jurisdiction over admi-
ralty matters and claims "arising under" as declared in the Canter case,
both prior and subsequent to the Judiciary Act of 1875, is the mainstay
of the majority opinion. It was noted that since 1789 Congress has
specially provided for admiralty courts in which rights could be asserted
undcr federal maritime law. In addition, to construe maritime claims as
arising under the laws of the United States, within the framework of
17. There are three jurisdictional routes by which an admiralty case can reach
a federal district court tinder the present Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 (1958).
First, jurisdiction may be founded on section 1331, under which the district courts have
jurisdiction of "all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Second, %vhere there is diversity
of citizenship, the federal court has jurisdiction under section 1332. Ihirly, an admiralty
suit nay be heard under section 1333, which does not contemplate a jiury trial.
18. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON iE JUDICIAL ConE § 0.03 (22) (1949).
19. Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). cf. Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Bell v. flood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946);
Cully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & Nashville 11.R. Co.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See generally London, "Federal Question Jurisdiction"-
A Snare and a Delusion. 57 Nbc. L. R.ekv, 835 (1959).
20. 194 F.2d 834 (tst Cir. 1952).
21. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955);
Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). See also, Jesonis v. 0. J. Olson & Co.,
238 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1956); Troupe v. Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit
Co., 234 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1956).
22. Although on different lines of argument.
23. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. at 278 (1959).
24. The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453 (1879), is distinguished on the grounds
that the court was interpreting a congressional statute to grant admiralty jurisdiction
to territorial courts in light of the purposes of a particular statute.
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section 1331, would result in a maritime cause of action being removable
from a state court under section 144125 and thus would defeat the aim
of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve the traditionally exercised con-
current jurisdiction of state courts in admiralty matters.
Although it is admitted that the doctrine of supremacy of federal
maritime law had recently been greatly expanded, the Court rebutted the
theory that a claim under maritime law gives rise to "federal question"
jurisdiction, because such law had become part of the laws of the United
States. It is said that the "federal nature" of maritime law has long been
a part of maritime jurisprudence,2-3 thus the view that federal maritime
law has been adopted as part of the laws of the United States2" cannot
be considered a novel development warranting an inclusion of admiralty
jurisdiction under section 1331.
To the considerations of history and policy, the Court adds its "deeply
felt and traditional reluctance . . . to expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes." 28
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom the Chief Justice joined, dissenting
in part and concurring in part, contended that section 1331, which gives
power to a federal court to administer common law remedies, which have
their origin in federal law, is not subject to an exception for rights
taking their origin in federal maritime law. To support this contention
it is maintained that general maritime law, as enunciated by the courts,
does constitute law which "arises under" within the meaning of section 1331,
in accordance with the view expressed in Doucette v. Vincent" and the
Jensen line of cases. 0 ' The dissent goes on to state that maritime matters
are not exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty courts as
certain causes of action in admiralty may be brought at law, either under
the "saving to suitors" clause, or by virtue of a statute such as the Jones
Act. Mr. Justice Brennan conceded that certain classes of cases, such as
the traditional in rem, prize, and seizure cases, lay within the exclusive
jurisdiction of admiralty courts, but all other suits of an in personam
nature might be brought in the state courts or under diversity jurisdiction
in the federal courts. Thus, it is argued that these actions at law, are not
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b)(1958): "Any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arisng under the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of the parties."
26. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 654 (1874).
27. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).
28. Romero v. International Operating Co., 358 U.S. at 379 (1959).
29, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
30. Gases cited note 13 supra.
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to be excluded from the grant of section 1331, in that they arise under
the laws'" of the United StatcsY
The Romero case firmly settles the controversy between the circuits
by overruling the contentions set forth by the First Circuit in Doucette v.
Vincent.33 while supporting the position taken by the Second and Third
Circuits in the Paduano34 and Jordine '5 cases. In so doing, the question,
of whether a federal district court has the jurisdiction in maritime matters
to hear a claim on its law side, in the absence of diversity of citizenship,
is definitely answered in the negative. This position reaffirms a long period
of judicial acceptance of the distinction between general maritime law
and that of cases "arising under" and is clearly consistent with an under-
standing of the historical background of admiralty jurisdiction.
DAVID P. KARCHER
WORTHLESS CHECK STATUTE -PENALTY PROVISION
Petitioner sought release from the state prison by writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the worthless check statute under which he was
convicted of a felony set forth a misdemeanor at most. The statute
analogizes the punishment for uttering a bad check to that of larceny,
the grade of which offense, whether grand (felony) or petit (misdemeanor),
is established according 'to the value of the property stolen. But the
information filed against petitioner failed to charge that he had received
value for his check. Held, issuance of a bad check without receipt of
value must be classified as a misdemeanor since it is not otherwise
classified as a felony, either by definition or by penalty. State ex rel.
Shargaa v. Culver, 113 So.2d 383 (Fla. 1959).
In addition to statutes in every jurisdiction which penalize the obtaining
of property by worthless cheek,' forty-one states have also condemned
31. Here the dissent cites the Erie case in support of the contention that the word
"laws" includes court decisions.
32. Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined, dissented from the
major question under discussion for the reasons stated by Mr. Jnstiec Brennan and as
set forth by Judge Magruder in Doucette v, Vincent. This dissent felt that the "rea1l
core of the jurisdictional controversy is whether a few more seamen can have their
suits for damages passed on by federal juries instead of judges."
33. 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
34. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha. 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
35. Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
1. A surv'ey of statutes reveals that all states have protected themselves against
the issuance of worthless checks when property is obtained thereby. Only in Oklahoma
does this protection take the form of a standard false pretenses statute and nothing
more. OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1541 (1951) itemizes a bogus check as one of several
"false pretenses." In all other states additional laws specifically cover obtaining property
by bogus check. Florida's provisions are typical. A bad cheek passer might be indicted
tinider a general false pretenses statute, FLA. STAr. § 811.021(1)(a) (1957), or a
statute condemning the obtaining of property by issuance of a worthless check, FLA.
S'rAT. § 832.05(3) (1957). (A third and separate charge might be pressed under a statute
condemning the mere issuance of bogus checks, FLA. STAT. § 832.05(2) (1957)).
[VOL, XIV
